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 Extending theory within the justice domain and work on the human alarm 
system, the current paper argues that the process by which justice judgments are 
formed may be influenced reliably by the activation of psychological systems that 
people use to detect and handle alarming situations. Building on this analysis, it is 
further proposed that if this line of reasoning is true then presenting alarm-related 
stimuli, such as exclamation points and flashing lights, to people should lead to more 
extreme judgments about subsequent justice-related events than not presenting these 
alarming stimuli. Findings collected using different experimental paradigms provide 
evidence supporting these predictions both inside and outside the psychology lab. 
Implications for the social psychology of justice and the human alarm system 
literature are discussed. 
 
 
Keywords:  justice, fairness, procedures, outcomes, human alarm system 
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Justice and the Human Alarm System: 
The Impact of Exclamation Points and Flashing Lights 
on the Justice Judgment Process 
 A central finding in social psychology is the discovery that fair and unfair 
events have profound influence on people's justice judgments and that these 
judgments in turn often have important effects on other beliefs, attitudes, and 
behaviors (for overviews, see, e.g., Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Folger & 
Cropanzano, 1998; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992). People distinguish 
readily between decision-making procedures according to the justice of these 
procedures. For example, when the procedure used to make a decision entails the use 
of all relevant information versus only some information, people evaluate the more 
accurate procedure as more just than the inaccurate procedure (see, e.g., Barrett-
Howard & Tyler, 1986; Van den Bos, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997; see also Leventhal, 
1980). Similarly, when people are or are not allowed an opportunity to voice their 
opinion about decisions to be made, they generally judge the voice procedure as more 
just than the no-voice procedure (e.g., Folger, Rosenfield, Grove, & Corkran, 1979; 
Lind, Kanfer, & Earley, 1990; Van den Bos, Lind, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997). 
Comparable justice judgment effects have been found with respect to the allocation of 
outcomes: Some of the classic studies in social psychology indicate that when people 
receive outcomes that are equal to the outcomes that comparable others have received 
they judge their outcome to be more just than when their outcome is worse than the 
others' outcome (see, e.g., Adams, 1965; Blau, 1964; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). 
 These findings show that people differentiate readily between fair and unfair 
procedures and outcomes. Other studies have shown that justice judgments have 
substantial effects on other beliefs and attitudes (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998) and on 
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behavior, especially cooperative behavior and compliance with authorities and 
organizations (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992). For example, judging a 
particular outcome or treatment to be just appears to be among the prime antecedents 
of positive social actions like obeying laws (Tyler, 2006), accepting the decisions of 
group authorities (Tyler & Lind, 1992), and behaving in ways that go "above and 
beyond" the requirements of one’s job (Moorman & Byrne, 2005). Judging procedural 
treatment or a division of outcomes to be unjust appears to be a strong antecedent of 
such actions as theft (Greenberg, 1993), violent aggression (Folger & Skarlicki, 1998), 
and the initiation of lawsuits (Lind, Greenberg, Scott, & Welchans, 2000). Indeed, 
work in various scientific disciplines (ranging from ethology to economics; see, e.g., 
De Waal, 1996; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986; Tyler, 2006) has shown that 
social justice represents a core issue in society, politics, organizations, and intimate 
relationships. As a result, justice considerations arise in almost every social situation 
in which people interact with each other (Folger, 1984). So, one can correctly assert 
that the study of how justice judgments are formed should occupy a prominent place 
in social psychological research. In this paper we focus on this issue. 
 More specifically, we will study here the social-cognitive dynamics of how 
justice judgments are formed. Although the first justice work in social psychology 
(Adams, 1965) merged concepts that we would now consider social cognition with 
concerns that arise in interpersonal relationships, much of the next three decades of 
social justice research was absorbed in documenting the importance of justice 
judgments and in analyzing the social psychology of justice largely from motivational 
perspectives (De Cremer & Tyler, 2005; Tyler & Lind, 1992). During those years, 
relatively less attention was given to the social-cognitive dynamics involved in 
generating social justice judgments (there were, however, some notable exceptions; 
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see, e.g., Hafer, 2000; Steiner, Guirard, & Baccino, 1999). Recently, a new wave of 
social justice research has begun investigating how justice judgments are formed (e.g., 
Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Van den Bos, 2001; Van Prooijen, Karremans, & Van 
Beest, 2006), and the findings of this research have helped social psychology to generate 
new models of social justice (e.g., Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Van den Bos & Lind, 
2002) or to refine insights into existing justice theories and other important social 
psychological frameworks (e.g., Van den Bos, Poortvliet, Maas, Miedema, & Van den 
Ham, 2005; Van den Bos & Van Prooijen, 2001). In the studies reported in the current 
paper we continue this new line of social justice research by testing a possible 
connection between a newly-established social justice phenomenon (the augmentation 
of justice effects in the presence of personal uncertainty or other self-threatening 
conditions) and some potentially related phenomena in social cognition and social 
neuroscience showing the possible existence of a "human alarm system" (Eisenberger 
& Lieberman, 2004; Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003; Lieberman & 
Eisenberger, 2004; Murray, Holmes, & Collins, 2005; see also Carter et al., 2000; 
Klein, 1996; Liddell et al., 2005; Tillfors, 2004). Integrating these two lines of 
research, we provide impetus to the development of a theoretically new perspective 
on how people form justice judgments, the alarm-system model of the justice 
judgment process. 
An Alarm-System Model of Justice Judgments 
 Our previous work emphasized the important role that personal uncertainty 
(see, e.g., Van den Bos, 2001; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002) or other self-threatening 
conditions (see, e.g., Miedema, Van den Bos, & Vermunt, 2006) play in the process 
of how people form justice judgments. Most uncertainty management models (e.g., 
Hogg, 2004; McGregor, 2004; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002) assume that people have a 
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fundamental need to feel certain about their world and their place within it, that 
uncertainty can be threatening, and that people generally feel a need either to 
eliminate uncertainty or to find some way to make it tolerable and cognitively 
manageable. Therefore, many uncertainty management theories propose that people 
want to protect themselves from being in or thinking of situations in which they were 
uncertain about themselves. One way in which people can do this is by adhering to 
their cultural norms and values (e.g., Van den Bos et al., 2005). Experiences that are 
supportive of people's cultural worldviews lead them to be less uncertain about 
themselves or to be better able to better tolerate the uncertainty (e.g., Van den Bos, 
Heuven, Burger, & Fernández Van Veldhuizen, 2006). As a result, uncertainty 
management theories hypothesize that people who are uncertain about themselves or 
who have been reminded about their personal uncertainties will react very positively 
toward worldview-supportive experiences (such as experiences of fair treatment; e.g., 
Van den Bos, 2001). In contrast, experiences that threaten or impinge on people's 
worldviews do not help at all to in coping with personal uncertainties, and hence 
people will respond very negatively toward these worldview-threatening experiences 
(such as experiences of unfair events; e.g., Van den Bos et al., 2005). 
 Several research studies indeed have shown that reminding people of their 
personal uncertainties lead to more intensified judgments of fair and unfair events so 
that people make more extreme judgments about accurate or inaccurate procedures, 
voice or no-voice procedures, and good or bad outcomes when uncertainty is salient 
(e.g., Van den Bos, 2001; Van den Bos et al., 2005; see also De Cremer & Sedikides, 
2005). Furthermore, Miedema et al. (2006) revealed that when people feel they have 
been judged negatively by important others, this will lead to interaction effects with 
fairness manipulations such that people will show more extreme judgments of 
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procedural and outcome justice when they have been confronted with these kinds of 
self-threats than when they have not been faced with these self-threats. 
Thus, it is now well established in the justice literature that personal 
uncertainty (Van den Bos, 2001; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002; Van den Bos et al., 
2005) and other self-threatening conditions (Miedema et al., 2006) lead to more 
extreme judgments about procedural and outcome justice. Interestingly, in the 
literatures on close relationships and social neuroscience, personal uncertainty and 
self-threats recently have been suggested to lead to the activation of the "human alarm 
system," a psychological system that people use to detect and handle alarming 
situations and that prompts people to process more alertly what is going on in the 
situations they find themselves in. For example, Murray et al. (2005) recently 
suggested that personal uncertainty (Murray, Rose, Bellavia, Holmes, & Garrett 
Kusche, 2002; see also Hogg, 2005; McGregor, Zanna, Holmes, & Spencer, 2001) and 
felt insecurity in close relationships (Murray, 2005; Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 2000; 
Murray, Holmes, MacDonald, & Ellsworth, 1998) activate the human alarm system so 
that, among other things, people process more alertly what is happening in their 
relationships. 
Related to this, Eisenberger et al. (2003) have argued that being ostracized or 
experiencing other self-threatening events activates parts of the human brain which 
Eisenberger et al. have labeled the human alarm system. Furthermore, Eisenberger 
and Lieberman (2004; Lieberman & Eisenberger, 2004) proposed that the alarm 
system is responsible for detecting cues that might be harmful to survival and, after 
activation, for recruiting attention and coping responses to minimize threat. For 
example, Eisenberger et al. (2003) have argued that experiencing social exclusion or 
other self-threatening events may be an experience of social pain. Like physical pain, 
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the experience of social pain may trigger the human alarm system, hence "alerting us 
when we have sustained  injury to our social connections" (Eisenberger et al., 2003, p. 
292, emphasis added). The working of such an alarm system would be adaptive (see 
Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2004) in that an activated alarm system would prompt the 
human organism to act and respond more quickly or otherwise alertly toward what is 
going on in the organism's environment. 
What we are proposing here is that one way to triangulate the relationships 
between personal uncertainty and self-threats (Miedema et al., 2006; Van den Bos, 
2001; Van den Bos et al., 2005), the human alarm system (Eisenberger & Lieberman, 
2004; Eisenberger et al., 2003; Murray et al., 2005), and social justice judgments is by 
conceptualizing an overlap between the alarm system and the justice judgment 
process. We think it is interesting to propose such an overlap because one of the 
hypotheses that could be derived from such a postulated overlap is that factors that 
people associate with alarming conditions should enhance the sensitivity of the alarm 
system and thus, given the postulated overlap, potentiate sensitivity to the justice-
related events people subsequently experience. So, just as Eisenberger and Lieberman 
(2004) postulated that the brain bases of social pain are similar to those of physical 
pain and hypothesized that "factors that enhance the sensitivity to one type of pain 
should enhance the sensitivity of this alarm system and thus potentiate sensitivity to 
the other type of pain as well" (p. 297), we postulate here that presenting to people 
alarm-related symbols should activate the human alarm system and hence potentiate 
sensitivity to other types of processes associated with it as well, including enhanced 
sensitivity to the justice judgment process, thus making people to react more 
sensitively toward subsequently experienced fair or unfair events, such as good or bad 
procedures and outcomes. 
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More specifically, from the literature reviewed here at least two things can be 
concluded: (1) personal uncertainty and other self-threatening conditions activate the 
human alarm system (Eisenberger et al., 2003; Murray et al., 2005); (2) personal 
uncertainty and self-threatening conditions lead to more extreme judgments about 
procedural and outcome justice (Miedema et al., 2006; Van den Bos 2001; Van den 
Bos et al., 2005). Thus, it is known that the same conditions that may activate the 
human alarm system may also lead to more extreme justice judgments. Building on 
this observation, this suggests that activating the human alarm system directly, for 
example by presenting alarm-related stimuli to people, should lead to more extreme 
judgments about procedural and outcome justice. An intriguing hypothesis that 
therefore follows from the line of reasoning presented here is that the presentation of 
cues that are closely or even subtly related to alarming conditions may lead people to 
form more extreme judgments about subsequently presented procedures and 
outcomes. The current paper tests whether reliable evidence for this hypothesis can be 
found. 
The Current Research 
To our knowledge, the alarm-system perspective has not been integrated with 
the justice literature before, so the union of the two lines of work may be a strength of 
the current paper and may give new insights into the process by which justice 
judgments are formed. Furthermore, we think there are at least three other reasons that 
obtaining evidence for this line of reasoning may make a new contribution to the 
literature. 
First, besides the convergence of phenomena suggested by similarities 
between the uncertainty and self-threat findings reported in the alarm-system 
(Eisenberger et al., 2003; Murray et al., 2005) and justice literatures (Miedema et al., 
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2006; Van den Bos, 2001; Van den Bos et al., 2005), we think there are other good 
reasons that an alarm-system view of the justice judgment process may need to be 
incorporated into theories of the social psychology of justice. After all, adopting an 
alarm-system perspective suggests that an important function of social justice may be 
that justice is one of the signs to which Murray et al. (2005) and Eisenberger and 
Lieberman (2004; Eisenberger et al., 2003) were referring when proposing that people 
with an activated alarm system would look for information what is happening in the 
situation in which they find themselves. In fact, in correspondence with the relational 
work by Murray et al. (1998, 2000, 2002, 2005) and the social exclusion work by 
Eisenberger et al. (2003), social justice has been explicitly linked to indications of 
good relational treatment (Tyler & Lind, 1992). Fair procedures and outcomes are 
thought to be signals of whether one is included as opposed to excluded from 
important relationships (Lind, 2001; Leung, Tong, & Ho, 2004; Van den Bos, Lind, & 
Wilke, 2001). The relational quality of fair treatment and the inclusion message 
conveyed by fair events suggest that, after the alarm system has been activated, 
experiencing fair treatment and other fair events may well signal that threats are less 
severe than was assumed during the activation of the alarm system. 
Second, if the line of reasoning that we have developed here is true then it 
should be the case that presenting social cues that are even only subtly related to 
alarming conditions will lead people to form more extreme procedural and outcome 
justice judgments. In Experiments 1 to 3 of this paper, we will test the implications of 
this line of reasoning by presenting exclamation points (versus blank screens or 
scrambled exclamation points) to our participants. We argue that people have learned 
to associate exclamation points with signals to be alert that something is or will be 
going on. For example, at www.wikepedia.com, an encyclopedia on the internet, it is 
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stated that exclamation points are often used to emphasize a warning and that warning 
signs are often an exclamation point enclosed within a triangle. Furthermore, on these 
warning signs, exclamation points are often used to draw attention to a warning of 
danger, hazards, and the unexpected. These signs are common in hazardous 
environments or on potentially dangerous equipment. Granted, exclamation points 
may not always indicate alarm (as in the case of ending a sentence telling someone 
that something she did was simply great). But when presented alone, the exclamation 
point usually is a warning sign, quite often seen in Europe--where our research was 
conducted--and elsewhere as a road sign and a warning to be careful. We therefore 
reason that if our line of reasoning about connections between a human alarm system 
and the justice judgment process is true then this implies that the presentation of 
exclamation points, being symbols that are subtly related to alarming conditions, 
should lead participants to form more extreme justice judgments in a subsequent, 
unrelated task. Specifically, we test whether exposure to exclamation points later 
produce more extreme justice judgments about accurate or inaccurate procedures 
(Experiment 1), good or bad outcomes (Experiment 2), and voice or no-voice 
procedures (Experiment 3). 
Third, if our line of reasoning has merit then we should be able to find 
evidence for it outside the psychological laboratory. In Experiment 4, therefore, we 
test our line of reasoning in a real-world setting by interviewing people about good 
and bad outcome distributions in a situational context where a flashing warning light 
of the sort used on emergency vehicles or to warn of road hazards had (versus had 
not) been switched on. Following our research hypothesis, we examine whether 
people will show more extreme outcome justice judgments when the flashing light 
was switched on. With all our experiments we try to achieve an important aim of this 
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paper, namely to show that the justice judgment process may well be affected by 
alarming stimuli; stimuli that, we think, most justice researchers would not have 
thought to have an effect on people's justice judgments, yet that logically can be 
derived from the alarm-system view of the justice judgment process presented here. 
Experiment 1 
 In Experiments 1 and 2, participants in our experimental conditions viewed 
an exclamation point prior to, and unrelated to, evaluating the justice of an accurate or 
inaccurate procedure (Experiment 1; cf. Barrett-Howard & Tyler, 1986; Leventhal, 
1980; Van den Bos, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997) and a good or bad outcome (Experiment 
2; cf. Adams, 1965; Blau, 1964; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). Following the line of 
reasoning described above, we predicted that having participants look at these alarm-
related symbols would lead to their justice judgments being more strongly affected by 
the information conveyed by our procedure and outcome manipulations, compared to 
when participants did not look at exclamation points. This prediction constituted our 
main hypothesis of Experiments 1 and 2. 
 Furthermore, if exclamation points are indeed symbols that signal to people 
to be alert, as we are proposing here, then this should be evident in cognitive process 
measures. Evidence in cognitive psychology suggests that increased alertness is 
indicated by more rapid responding to subsequent events (e.g., Callejas, Lupianez, & 
Tudela, 2004; see also Posner & Petersen, 1990). This suggests that support for our 
line of reasoning should be indicated by faster responses among participants in our 
exclamation point conditions when judging the justice of the events they subsequently 
experience, compared to participants who did not look at exclamation points. To 
check whether watching exclamation points indeed has these effects on participants' 
response latencies, the time participants needed to answer the justice judgments of 
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Experiments 1 and 2 was measured. 
 We hasten to note that although we argue that the modal consequence of 
enhanced activity of the alarm system may be faster responding to subsequently 
experienced procedures and outcomes, it may be likely that there is a range of 
consequences of enhanced activity of the alarm system. In humans, for example, an 
alarm signal may set in motion contemplation or introspection, not for the purpose of 
an immediate response but simply to understand the nature of one's social 
environment or to consider how the event producing the alarm reflects on one's 
identity and self-worth (Lieberman & Eisenberger, 2004). Thus, although we propose 
that activating the human alarm system will lead to more alert information processing 
as indicated in participants forming their justice judgments more rapidly, it could also 
be predicted that more alert processing could lead to a more cautious analysis of the 
justice outcome and thus to slower response latencies. While this sometimes may be 
the case, we also think that it is reasonable to propose that the modal response of an 
alerted organism may be faster responding to events encountered by the organism (see 
also Lieberman & Eisenberger, 2004). Most alarming situations do not allow for 
contemplation and introspection, but rather require that people respond rather quickly 
to what is going on. The response latencies data we collected in Experiments 1-3 were 
assessed to find out whether this line of reasoning has merit. 
Method 
 Participants and design. One hundred and twenty-four students (85 women)1 
at Utrecht University participated in the experiment and were paid for their 
participation. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the conditions of the 2 
(characters: exclamation point vs. none) x 2 (procedure: accurate vs. inaccurate) 
factorial design. Thirty-one participants took part in each of the four conditions.  
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 Experimental procedure. Students at Utrecht University were invited to the 
laboratory to participate in a study on how people perform tasks. On arrival at the 
laboratory, participants were led to separate cubicles, each of which contained a 
computer with a monitor and a keyboard. The computers were used to present the 
stimulus information and to measure the dependent variables and the manipulation 
checks. Participants took part in our experiment after participating in other, unrelated 
experiments. The experiments lasted a total of 30 minutes, and participants were paid 
4 Euros for their participation (1 Euro equaled approximately $1.25 U.S. at the time 
the studies in this paper were conducted). 
 The experiment was presented to the participants as two separate studies. In 
the first study, all the participants were told that recent research had suggested that 
looking at their computer screens for 1 minute would help the researchers of the 
current study in their research efforts. Participants were therefore asked to look at 
their computer screens for 1 minute. The characters manipulation was then induced: 
In the exclamation point condition, an exclamation point of 30 x 5 millimeters (which 
is 1.18 x 0.20 inch) was presented for 1 minute at the center of participants' screens. 
In the no characters condition, no characters were presented on participants' computer 
screens. 
 After this, all participants completed the Positive and Negative Affect 
Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), on which they reported on 20 
items how they felt at the moment. Building on earlier justice studies (e.g., Van den 
Bos, 2001; Van den Bos & Miedema, 2000), the PANAS served as a filler task and to 
determine whether the characters manipulation engendered effects on positive and 
negative affect. The PANAS is the most widely used affect scale in social psychology 
and consists of two ten-item subsets (Watson et al., 1988), one measuring positive 
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affect (PA) and one measuring negative affect (NA). Following recommendations by 
Watson et al. (1988) and following previous studies (e.g., Van den Bos, 2001; Van 
den Bos & Miedema, 2000) both subsets were averaged to form reliable scales 
(alpha's = .89 and .80, respectively).  
 After the first study had ended, the second study began. In this study, 
participants were asked to imagine the following situation: 
 You are someone who wants a job. You have applied for a vacant position in an 
organization, MicroMac Inc., and you want this position very much. MicroMac 
informs you that they are interested in you and they invite you to participate in 
the selection process that, as a standard procedure, all screened applicants at 
MicroMac have to complete. The selection process consists of nine parts: an 
intelligence test, a personality test, a test assessing mathematics skills, a test 
assessing understanding of technical matters, a test assessing calculation skills, 
a test assessing language skills, a questionnaire assessing demographic data, a 
test assessing achievement motivation, and an interview with a personnel 
officer at MicroMac. You go to MicroMac and participate in the selection 
process. 
This was followed by the manipulation of procedure. Participants read the sentence 
(manipulated information in italics): 
 A week after you participated in the selection process you are informed that all 
9 parts / 1 of the 9 parts of the selection process were graded. 
This manipulation, varying whether the procedure to make an outcome decision 
entails the use of all relevant information (accurate procedure) versus only some 
information (inaccurate procedure), is one that is often used in the social justice 
literature (e.g., Van den Bos, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997; see also Leventhal, 1980). 
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 After this manipulation, the dependent variables were measured. All ratings 
were made on 7-point Likert-type scales. The main dependent variables in Experiment 
1 were participants' judgments of procedural justice: Participants were asked how just 
(1 = very unjust, 7 = very just), appropriate (1 = very inappropriate, 7 = very 
appropriate), and justified (1 = very unjustified, 7 = very justified) they considered the 
way they were treated. Participants' answers to these three items were averaged to 
form a reliable scale of procedural justice judgments (alpha = .97). As mentioned 
earlier, as a check on the characters manipulation, the time that participants needed to 
answer the procedural justice judgments was measured by the computers.2 After this, 
participants were paid for their participation and were thoroughly debriefed. During 
the debriefing procedure, participants indicated that they did not perceive a direct 
relationship between the characters manipulation and their reactions to the application 
scenario. Participants were not suspicious about our manipulations and did not object 
to the experimental procedure used in the experiment. 
Results 
 Manipulation check. A 2 x 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the response 
latencies scale showed a main effect of the characters manipulation only, F(1, 118) = 
6.08, p < .02. This indicated that participants in the exclamation point condition 
responded faster to the procedural justice questions (M = 3.12 seconds, SD = 1.66 
seconds) than participants in the no characters condition (M = 3.62 seconds, SD = 
1.46 seconds). We will return to these findings in Experiments 2 and 3 and in the 
General Discussion. 
 PANAS. The PANAS was administered following the characters 
manipulation, as a filler task and to determine whether there were effects of the 
characters manipulation on the positive and negative subsets. A 2 x 2 multivariate 
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analysis of variance (MANOVA) on the positive and negative subsets of the PANAS 
yielded no effects at both the multivariate and univariate levels. This suggests that 
differences in affective states cannot explain the findings reported here. Overall 
means of the positive and negative subsets were 2.64 (SD = 0.77) and 1.34 (SD = 
0.39), respectively. Furthermore, after applying the appropriate Bonferroni adjustment 
(see Hays, 1981), a 2 x 2 MANOVA on all the 20 PANAS items did not yield any 
significant effects, suggesting that in Experiment 1 specific affective reactions were 
not influenced by our exclamation point manipulation. 
 Dependent variables. Participants' procedural justice judgments indicated a 
main effect of procedure, F(1, 120) = 123.83, p < .001, and the predicted interaction 
effect, F(1, 120) = 5.89, p < .02. The main effect of the characters manipulation was 
not significant. Figure 1 shows these effects. As hypothesized, results showed that the 
simple main effect of the procedure manipulation was stronger in the exclamation 
point condition, F(1, 120) = 91.87, p < .001, η2 = .43, than in the no characters 
condition, F(1, 120) = 37.85, p < .001, η2 = .24. Thus, replicating earlier procedural 
justice studies (e.g., Van den Bos, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997), these findings indicate 
that in the no characters condition, participants' justice judgments were more positive 
following the accurate procedure information (M = 4.60, SD = 1.43) than following 
the inaccurate procedure information (M = 2.66, SD = 1.17). Furthermore, as 
predicted in the current paper, in the exclamation point condition the difference 
between the accurate (M = 5.30, SD = 1.30) and inaccurate (M = 2.27, SD = 1.17) 
procedure conditions was even greater. 
 It can also be noted here that the characters manipulation yielded a 
significant simple main effect within the accurate procedure condition, F(1, 120) = 
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4.88, p < .03, and a statistically nonsignificant effect within the inaccurate procedure 
condition, F(1, 120) = 1.50, p > .22. We will come back to this finding in the General 
Discussion. 
Discussion 
 As hypothesized on the basis of our integration of the social justice literature 
(e.g., Miedema et al., 2006; Van den Bos, 2001; Van den Bos et al., 2005) with recent 
developments within the psychology of human alarm systems (e.g., Eisenberger et al., 
2003; Murray et al., 2005), the findings of Experiment 1 show that watching 
exclamation points indeed cause people's justice judgments to be more extreme when 
responding to variations in procedural accuracy. Furthermore, in accordance with 
evidence in cognitive psychology that increased alertness is indicated by more rapid 
responding to subsequent events (e.g., Callejas et al., 2004; Posner & Petersen, 1990), 
our findings also showed that participants in the exclamation point condition took less 
time to construct their justice judgments. The findings reported in Experiment 1 are 
exciting, we think, partly because until the analysis of the justice judgment process 
put forward in the current paper, these effects would not have been predicted by social 
psychologists and other scientists studying social justice, yet they confidently could 
be predicted following the alarm-system view of the justice judgment process 
presented here. Before we draw any strong conclusions on the basis of these findings, 
however, it was important to conduct a second experiment. 
Experiment 2 
 Participants in the experimental condition of Experiment 2 again viewed an 
exclamation point. To ensure an even better control condition than in Experiment 1, 
participants in the control condition of Experiment 2 viewed a scrambled exclamation 
point. That is, in the control condition of Experiment 2, the components that 
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constitute an exclamation point (a line and a dot) were now rearranged such that they 
did not constitute an exclamation point any more. In this way, participants in both the 
experimental and the control conditions viewed the same characters (a line and a dot), 
but in the experimental condition the characters constituted an exclamation point 
whereas in the control condition they did not. 
 Because the psychology of justice entails judgments of outcome justice, as 
well as judgments of procedural justice (cf. Experiment 1), we varied that participants 
of Experiment 2 received either a good or a bad outcome such that participants 
received an outcome that was either equal to or that was worse than the outcome of a 
comparable other person (cf. Adams, 1965; Blau, 1964; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; see 
also Van den Bos, Wilke, Lind, & Vermunt, 1998). Our main dependent variables 
were participants' justice outcome judgments, and again we checked the time 
participants needed to complete these judgments. 
Method 
 Participants and design. Fifty-nine students (43 women) at Utrecht 
University participated in the experiment and were paid for their participation. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the conditions of the 2 (characters: 
exclamation point vs. scrambled exclamation point) x 2 (outcome: good vs. bad) 
factorial design. Fourteen or 15 participants took part in each of the four conditions. 
 Experimental procedure. The experimental procedure was the same as in 
Experiment 1, except for the points mentioned below. Participants took part in the 
experiment before and after participating in other, unrelated experiments. The 
experiments lasted a total of 40 minutes, and participants were paid 4 Euros for their 
participation. 
 The experiment was again presented to the participants as two separate 
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studies. The first study was the same as in Experiment 1, except that in the control 
condition the characters (line and dot) that formed the exclamation point in the 
exclamation point condition were now rearranged such that they did not constitute an 
exclamation point any more. More specifically, in the exclamation point condition the 









After this, as in Experiment 1, all participants completed the PANAS, with both the 
positive and negative subsets again yielding reliable scales (alpha's = .88 and .80, 
respectively). 
 After the first study had ended, the second study started. In this study, 
participants were asked to imagine the following situation: 
 In the dorm where a friend of yours is living a room is vacant. You are 
applying for this room. You know that your friend's room is comparable to 
the room you are applying for and that she pays a monthly rent of 200 Euros 
for her room. 
This was followed by the manipulation of outcome. Participants read the sentence 
(manipulated information in italics): 
 You go to the dorm and there you are told that you will have to pay a 
monthly rent of 200 / 300 Euros for your room. 
The manipulation of the payment to be equal to versus higher than that paid by a 
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similarly situated other is a classic manipulation of outcome fairness (e.g., Adams, 
1965). 
 The dependent variables were then measured. Building on Experiment 1, 
participants' judgments of outcome justice were assessed by asking participants how 
just (1 = very unjust, 7 = very just), appropriate (1 = very inappropriate, 7 = very 
appropriate), and justified (1 = very unjustified, 7 = very justified) they considered the 
rent that they had to pay for their room. Participants' answers to these three items 
were averaged to form a reliable scale of their outcome justice judgments (alpha = 
.98). As check on the characters manipulation, the time that participants needed to 
answer the outcome justice judgments was measured by the computers.3 
 After this, participants were paid for their participation and were thoroughly 
debriefed. During the debriefing procedure, participants indicated that they did not 
perceive a direct relationship between the characters manipulation and their reactions 
to the room scenario. Participants were not suspicious about our manipulations and 
did not object to the experimental procedure used in the experiment. 
Results 
 Manipulation check. As in Experiment 1, a 2 x 2 ANOVA on the response 
latencies scale showed a main effect of the characters manipulation, F(1, 54) = 12.87, 
p < .01, revealing that participants in the exclamation point condition took 
significantly less time to respond to the outcome justice questions (M = 3.14 seconds, 
SD = 1.67 seconds) than participants in the control condition (M = 5.09 seconds, SD = 
2.72 seconds). 
 PANAS. As in Experiment 1, a 2 x 2 MANOVA on the positive and negative 
subsets of the PANAS yielded no effects at both the multivariate and univariate 
levels. This suggests that overall affective states cannot explain the findings reported 
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here. Overall means of the positive and negative subsets were 2.39 (SD = 0.76) and 
1.23 (SD = 0.32), respectively. A 2 x 2 MANOVA on all the 20 PANAS items 
showed that, after applying the appropriate Bonferroni adjustment (see Hays, 1981), a 
significant effect of the exclamation point manipulation on the item that assesses 
excitement was found, F(1, 55) = 7.36, p < .01. This effect indicated that participants 
felt more excited in the exclamation point condition (M = 1.87, SD = 0.97) than in the 
scrambled exclamation point condition (M = 1.31, SD = 0.54).4 We will discuss the 
implication of this finding in the General Discussion. 
 Dependent variables. Participants' outcome justice judgments indicated a 
main effect of outcome, F(1, 55) = 365.55, p < .001, as well as the predicted 
interaction effect, F(1, 55) = 4.88, p < .04. The main effect of the characters 
manipulation was not significant. Figure 2 graphs these effects. As hypothesized, 
results showed that the simple main effect of the outcome manipulation was stronger 
in the exclamation point condition, F(1, 55) = 231.51, p < .001, η2 = .81, than in the 
control condition, F(1, 55) = 140.95, p < .001, η2 = .72. Thus, as predicted, these 
findings indicate that in the scrambled exclamation point condition, participants' 
justice judgments were more positive following the good outcome (M = 5.86, SD = 
1.00) than following the bad outcome (M = 2.33, SD = 0.98). Furthermore, in the 
exclamation point condition, the difference between the good (M = 6.44, SD = 0.66) 
and bad (M = 2.00, SD = 0.42) outcomes was even greater. 
 The characters manipulation yielded a significant simple main effect within 
the good outcome condition, F(1, 55) = 5.99, p < .02, and a statistically nonsignificant 
effect within the bad outcome condition, F(1, 55) = 1.30, p > .25. We will come back 
to this finding in the General Discussion. 
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 In line with what was predicted on the basis of the alarm-system view of the 
justice judgment process developed here, the findings of Experiments 1 and 2 reveal 
that looking at exclamation points lead people to show more extreme justice 
judgments in response to variations in procedural (Experiment 1) and outcome 
information (Experiment 2). Also, as predicted on the basis of cognitive psychological 
research (see, e.g., Callejas et al., 2004; Posner & Petersen, 1990), participants in the 
exclamation point conditions of both experiments needed less time to give their 
justice judgments. These findings suggest that watching exclamation points does 
indeed lead to a more alert judgment process (Callejas et al., 2004; Posner & Petersen, 
1990) and more extreme justice judgments, not only compared to people who look at 
blank screens (Experiment 1), but also compared to those who watch scrambled 
exclamation points (Experiment 2). However, before further conclusions were drawn, 
a third experiment was conducted. 
Experiment 3 
 Participants in Experiments 1 and 2 read and responded to justice scenarios. 
One might wonder whether similar results would be obtained when participants were 
exposed to a situation in which they directly experienced and responded to fair and 
unfair events. In Experiment 3, therefore, we ensured that the fairness manipulation 
was directly experienced by participants in an experimental paradigm that is often 
used for this purpose (see, e.g., Van den Bos, 2001; Van den Bos, Lind, et al., 1997; 
Van den Bos & Miedema, 2000; Van den Bos et al., 2005). Furthermore, in this 
paradigm we induced the most generally accepted and best-documented manipulation in 
procedural justice experiments: Participants were or were not allowed an opportunity to 
voice their opinions about a decision to be made (see, e.g., Brockner et al., 1998; Folger 
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et al., 1979; Lind et al., 1990; Van den Bos, 2001; Van den Bos, Lind, et al., 1997). 
 In the experiment, before manipulating the voice versus no-voice procedures, 
participants were asked to look for 1 minute at their computer screens and during this 
minute either an exclamation point was presented or a line with a dot on top of it (so 
that participants looked at the same stimuli but in one condition implying an 
exclamation point and in the other condition not implying an exclamation point). Our 
main prediction again was that participants' procedural justice judgments would be 
more strongly affected by the procedure manipulation in the exclamation point 
condition than in the scrambled exclamation point condition. In Experiment 3, we 
again were interested to see whether participants would be faster in their procedural 
justice judgment responses when primed with the exclamation point than when not 
primed with the exclamation point. 
Method 
 Participants and design. One hundred and eighty-six students (40 men and 
146 women) at Utrecht University participated in the experiment and were paid for 
their participation. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the conditions of the 
2 (characters: exclamation point vs. scrambled exclamation point) x 2 (procedure: 
voice vs. no voice) factorial design. One participant had difficulty understanding the 
stimulus materials, being a non-native speaker, and had to be excluded from the data 
set. Unfortunately, anonymous debriefing interviews, conducted after people 
participated in the study, suggested that in this experiment there may well have been a 
few participants who did not participate in a serious manner in the experiment. 
Following recommendations by various statistical handbooks (e.g., Cohen, Cohen, 
West, & Aiken, 2003; Tabachnick & Fidell, 1989), we checked whether outliers 
indeed were present in our data set. To this end, we followed a procedure suggested 
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by Cohen et al. (2003) and calculated Cook's distance measure (see Cook, 1977; see 
also Cohen et al., 2003) to assess whether some of the participants did in fact show 
statistically strange reactions on our main dependent variables (procedural justice 
judgments). This analysis indeed revealed that 10 of the remaining 185 participants 
could be identified as outliers.5 We dropped these participants, leaving 175 
participants (37 men and 138 women) in our final data set, with 43 or 44 participants 
in each of the four conditions of Experiment 3. 
 Experimental procedure. The experimental procedure was the same as in 
Experiments 1 and 2, except for the below-mentioned points, and closely followed the 
experimental paradigm used in earlier experiential justice studies (see, e.g., Van den 
Bos, 2001; Van den Bos, Lind, et al., 1997; Van den Bos & Miedema, 2000; Van den 
Bos et al., 2005). The experiment lasted a total of 40 minutes and participants were 
paid 4 Euros for their participation. In the first part of the instructions, participants 
were informed that they participated in the study with another person, referred to as 
Other. Participants were also told that the computers were connected to one another 
and that the experimenter could communicate with them by means of the computer 
network. The experimental procedure was then outlined to the participants: After the 
experimental tasks were explained, participants would practice the tasks for two 
minutes, after which time they would work on the tasks for ten minutes. Furthermore, 
participants were informed that, after all participants were run, a lottery would be held 
among all participants. The winner of this lottery would receive 50 Euros. (Actually, 
after all participants had completed the experiment, the 50 Euros were randomly 
given to one participant; a procedure to which none of the participants objected upon 
debriefing.) Participants were told that a total of 200 lottery tickets would be divided 
among all participants. Furthermore, participants were told that after the work round 
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the experimenter would divide some lottery tickets between them and Other. Several 
practice questions were posed to ensure comprehension of the lottery. If participants 
gave a wrong answer to a question, the correct answer was disclosed and main 
characteristics of the lottery were repeated. 
 The experimental tasks were then explained to the participants. Figures 
would be presented on the upper right part of the computer screen. Each figure 
consisted of 36 squares, and each square showed one of eight distinct patterns. On the 
upper left side of the computer screen one of the eight patterns would be presented, 
and participants had to count the number of squares with this pattern in the figure on 
the right side of the screen. When participants had indicated the correct number of 
patterns in the figure on the right side of the screen, another figure and another pattern 
would be presented on the screen. In both the practice round and the work round, the 
number of figures that the participant had counted constituted the number of tasks that 
the participant had completed. Furthermore, in both rounds, the number of tasks 
completed was presented on the lower right side of the screen. On the lower left side 
of the screen the time remaining in the present round was shown. 
 The practice round then began, after which the work round began. After the 
work round had ended, participants were told how many tasks they had completed in 
the work round, and--in order to ensure that participants compared themselves to 
Other--it was communicated to the participant that Other had completed an equivalent 
number of tasks. To assess whether participants thought of Other as a person who was 
comparable in the amounts of inputs he or she provided (cf. Van den Bos, Lind et al., 
1997), they were asked to what extent Other had performed well in the work round 
relative to the performance of the participant self (1 = much worse, 4 = equally, 7 = 
much better) and to what extent Other was good in performing the tasks in the work 
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round relative to the participant self (1 = much worse, 4 = equally, 7 = much better). 
After this, participants were asked to think for one minute about the percentage of 
lottery tickets that they should receive relative to Other. 
 As has been done in earlier justice studies (e.g., Van den Bos; 2001; Van den 
Bos & Miedema, 2000; Van den Bos et al., 2005), participants were then told that 
before the experimenter would divide the lottery tickets between them and Other, they 
would be asked to complete a different task, and that after they would have completed 
this task, the study would continue. The characters manipulation was then 
manipulated. The exclamation point condition was the same as in Experiments 1 and 
2. In the scrambled exclamation point condition of Experiment 3, the following set of 





After this, all participants completed the PANAS, with both the positive and negative 
subsets again yielding reliable scales (alpha's = .88 and .82, respectively). After they 
had completed the PANAS, all participants were told that by pushing the return button 
on the keyboard the study would continue. 
 The procedure was then manipulated in the same way as in earlier procedural 
justice experiments (e.g., Van den Bos, 2001; Van den Bos, Lind, et al., 1997; Van 
den Bos & Miedema, 2000; Van den Bos et al., 2005). In the voice condition, the 
experimenter allegedly asked participants, by means of the computer network, to type 
in their opinion about the percentage of tickets that they should receive relative to 
Other. (In reality, however, all stimulus information was preprogrammed.) 
Participants in the no voice condition were informed that they would not be asked to 
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type their opinion about the percentage of tickets that they should receive relative to 
Other. 
 After this, participants were asked questions pertaining to the dependent 
variables and manipulation checks. The same procedural justice judgment scale as in 
Experiment 1 was assessed (alpha = .97). Again, the time that participants needed to 
answer the procedural justice judgments was measured by the computers.6 In addition, 
following previous procedural justice studies (e.g., Van den Bos, 2001; Van den Bos, 
Lind, et al., 1997), the manipulation of procedure was further checked by asking 
participants to what extent they agreed with the statement that they had been given an 
opportunity to voice their opinion about the percentage of tickets that they should 
receive relative to Other (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) and to what 
extent they agreed with the statement that they had not been given an opportunity to 
voice their opinion about the percentage of tickets that they should receive relative to 
Other (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). After this, participants were paid 
for their participation and were thoroughly debriefed. During the debriefing 
procedure, participants indicated that they did not perceive a direct relationship 
between the characters manipulation and their reactions to the voice or no voice 
procedures. Participants were not suspicious about our manipulations and did not 
object to the experimental procedure used in the experiment. 
Results 
 Manipulation checks. As in Experiments 1 and 2, a 2 x 2 ANOVA on the 
response latencies scale showed a main effect of the characters manipulation, F(1, 
170) = 25.26, p < .001. Participants in the exclamation point condition responded 
significantly faster to the procedural justice questions (M = 3.89 seconds, SD = 1.72 
seconds) than participants in the scrambled explanation point condition (M = 5.36 
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seconds, SD = 1.80 seconds). In addition, the findings showed a significant main 
effect of the procedure manipulation, F(1, 170) = 4.84, p < .03, indicating that 
participants in the no-voice condition responded faster to the procedural justice 
questions (M = 4.32 seconds, SD = 1.89 seconds) than those in the voice condition (M 
= 4.92 seconds, SD = 1.88 seconds). This suggests that sometimes unfair procedures 
(such as no-voice procedures) may be responded to in faster ways than fair procedures 
(such as voice procedures). The interaction effect was not significant. 
 A 2 x 2 MANOVA on the two manipulation checks of procedure (the voice 
check and the no-voice check) yielded only a main effect of procedure at both the 
multivariate level and the univariate levels: multivariate F(2, 170) = 208.78, p < .001; 
for the voice check, F(1, 171) = 342.82, p < .001; for the no-voice check, F(1, 171) = 
291.94, p < .001. Participants in the voice condition agreed more with the statement 
that they received an opportunity to voice their opinion (M = 6.10, SD = 1.13) than 
participants in the no-voice condition (M = 2.01, SD = 1.73). Participants in the no-
voice condition agreed more with the statement that they did not receive an 
opportunity to voice their opinion (M = 5.72, SD = 1.81) than those in the voice 
condition (M = 1.77, SD = 1.22). In correspondence with earlier studies (e.g., Van den 
Bos, 2001; Van den Bos, Lind, et al., 1997; Van den Bos & Miedema, 2000; Van den 
Bos et al., 2005), these findings suggest that the procedure manipulation was 
successfully operationalized. 
 PANAS. A 2 x 2 MANOVA on the positive and negative subsets of the 
PANAS yielded no effects at both the multivariate and univariate levels. This 
suggests that differences in affective states cannot explain the findings reported here. 
Overall means of the positive and negative subsets were 2.51 (SD = 0.71) and 1.30 
(SD = 0.36), respectively. Furthermore, after applying the appropriate Bonferroni 
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adjustment (see Hays, 1981), a 2 x 2 MANOVA on all the 20 PANAS items did not 
yield any significant effects, suggesting that in Experiment 3 specific affective 
reactions were not influenced by our exclamation point manipulation. 
 Comparability measures. As expected, participants' comparability judgments 
yielded no significant effects at both the multivariate level and the univariate levels in 
a 2 x 2 MANOVA. Participants indicated that the other participant had performed 
equally well in the work round (M = 3.99, SD = 0.34) and was equally good in 
performing the tasks (M = 3.95, SD = 0.39). Thus, participants thought of the other 
person as a comparable person with respect to the tasks that were completed in the 
experiment. 
 Percentage findings. Participants who were allowed voice (n = 87) typed in 
their opinion about the percentage tickets that they should receive relative to the other 
participant. A one-way ANOVA yielded no significant effect of the characters 
manipulation. Inspection of the means indicated that participants typed in that the 
lottery tickets should be divided equally between themselves and the other participant: 
Eighty participants answered that they should get 50% of the tickets and the mean 
percentage was 52.54% (SD = 10.59). These findings are supportive of equity theory 
(see, e.g., Adams, 1965): Participants preferred to divide outcomes equally between 
themselves and the other participant (who contributed an equal amount of inputs, and 
who hence deserved--according to equity theory--to receive the same amount of 
outputs as the participants themselves). 
 Dependent variables. Participants' procedural justice judgments indicated a 
main effect of procedure, F(1, 171) = 240.04, p < .001, and the predicted interaction 
effect, F(1, 171) = 3.93, p < .05. The main effect of the characters manipulation was 
not significant. Figure 3 shows these effects. As hypothesized, the results indicated 
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that the simple main effect of the procedure manipulation was stronger in the 
exclamation point condition, F(1, 171) = 153.57, p < .001, η2 = .47, than in the 
scrambled exclamation point condition, F(1, 171) = 90.69, p < .001, η2 = .35. This 
indicates that in the scrambled exclamation point condition, participants' justice 
judgments were more positive following the voice procedure (M = 5.24, SD = 1.27) 
than following the no-voice procedure (M = 3.03, SD = 0.88). Moreover, in the 
exclamation point condition the difference between the voice (M = 5.49, SD = 1.02) 
and no-voice (M = 2.64, SD = 1.11) procedure conditions was even greater. 
 The characters manipulation did not yield statistically significant effects 
within both the voice and the no-voice conditions. This said, it can be noted here that 
the simple main effect of the characters manipulation was marginally significant 
within the no-voice condition, F(1, 171) = 2.94, p < .09, whereas such a trend was not 
found within the voice condition, F(1, 171) = 1.48, p > .22. We will return to these 
results in the General Discussion. 
Discussion 
 After manipulating procedural accuracy in Experiment 1 and outcome 
valence in Experiment 2, Experiment 3 varied that participants directly experienced 
voice or no-voice procedures. In correspondence with our predictions, we found that 
procedural justice judgments were more extreme when participants had been primed 
with an exclamation point as opposed to a scrambled exclamation point. Furthermore, 
participants were faster in giving their procedural justice judgments in the 
exclamation point condition than in the scrambled exclamation point condition. 
Participants were faster also to give their procedural justice judgments when 
responding to the no-voice procedures than when reacting to the voice procedures, 
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perhaps suggesting that negative procedures that people directly experience (as 
opposed to only read about; cf. Experiment 1) may impact the justice judgment 
process more than positive procedures do. 
 Taken together, the findings of Experiments 1 to 3 suggest that presenting 
large exclamation points for some time to people may lead to more extreme and more 
vigilantly constructed justice judgments. It could be argued that after having presented 
the results of these studies it is important to know (1) what the exclamation points 
primed and (2) whether evidence for our alarm-system predictions could also be 
found when we would present different alarm-related stimuli to people that are more 
directly related to alarming conditions people may encounter in everyday life. Our 
fourth full experiment was designed to address the latter point. 
 With respect to the former point of getting more information on what 
exclamation points prime, we can refer here to a line of research using functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) testing that some of us recently started (Van den 
Bos & Rijpkema, 2007). The data collected thus far suggest that watching an 
exclamation point especially leads to activation of a part of the medial frontal gyrus 
(Brodmann area [BA] 9). Interestingly, this area is also found to be active when 
people are performing personal moral judgment tasks and is known to be sensitive to 
tapping the combined effects of cognitive and emotional responses (Greene, Nystrom, 
Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 
2001). This may indicate that a combination of cognition and emotion best predicts 
how people form justice judgments and make personal moral decisions. In other 
words, the social psychology of justice and personal moral judgments may well 
involve hot cognitive, not cold cognitive, processes (Van den Bos, 2006). Future 
research is needed to pursue this line of research and line of thinking in more detail. 
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After having found evidence for our line of reasoning in controlled laboratory 
studies that showed that subtle representations of the alarm system (i.e., exclamation 
points) are sufficient to elicit more extreme justice judgments of fair and unfair 
procedures and outcomes, we sought to test our line of reasoning outside the 
psychology lab using a different set of alarming stimuli that may be more directly 
related to, and may have more face validity with respect to alarming conditions people 
may encounter in everyday life. Specifically, in Experiment 4 we used a flashing light 
of the sort used on emergency vehicles or to warn for road hazards, and as our alarm-
related manipulation we varied whether the flashing light had or had not been 
switched on. 
 Participants of Experiment 4 were people from various parts of the 
Netherlands, with different educational backgrounds, and from different age groups, 
who were interviewed in a shopping area of a medium-sized city located in the middle 
of the Netherlands. Building and extending on Experiment 2, we again varied that 
participants received a good or a bad outcome, but this time the outcome that 
participants themselves received was held constant and we varied whether a 
comparable other person received an outcome that was either equal or better than the 
outcome of the participants themselves (cf. Van den Bos, Lind, et al., 1997). Our main 
dependent variables were participants' justice outcome judgments. Because in 
Experiment 4 our stimulus materials were presented in paper-and-pencil format to our 
participants, we could not reliably assess participants' response latencies in this 
experiment and that is why we checked in Experiment 4 whether participants reported 








 Participants and design. One hundred and eighty individuals (95 women) 
participated in the experiment and were randomly assigned to one of the conditions of 
the 2 (flashing light: on vs. off) x 2 (outcome: good vs. bad) factorial design. Forty-
five participants took part in each of the four conditions. 
 Participants were interviewed in the shopping area of the city center of 
Amersfoort, a medium-sized city in the middle of the Netherlands that attracts 
customers from different parts of the country. Indeed, our participants came from 
various provinces of the Netherlands (Flevoland, Gelderland, Groningen, Noord 
Holland, Overijssel, and Utrecht). Mean age of the participants was 30.92 years (SD = 
14.56), with the youngest participant being 14 years old and the oldest participant 
being 78 years old. Twenty percent of the participants had completed a lower form of 
education (LO, LBO, VMBO, MAVO), 40% had completed a middle-level form of 
education (MBO, HAVO), 31% had completed a higher form of education (HBO, 
VWO), and 8% had completed a university degree (WO). 
 Experimental procedure. People who were walking in the shopping area of 
the city center of Amersfoort were asked whether they would like to participate in a 
study on how people process information and which would take a maximum of 10 
minutes of their time. Two meters behind the experimenter, an orange flashing light 
of 17 x 14 x 14 centimeters had been placed on a small pedestal of 1 meter high. Both 
the flashing light and pedestal were ostensibly unrelated to our study and the flashing 
light was connected by means of an electric cable of 1.5 meters long to a large store 
(Vroom & Dreesmann; a Dutch equivalent of Macy's). To induce the flashing light 
manipulation, the flashing light had been switched on for half of the participants and 
the flashing light was off for the other half of the participants.  
 At the beginning of the experiment, the experimenter handed participants a 
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questionnaire that contained the stimulus materials with which we induced the 
outcome manipulation of Experiment 4 and with which we measured the dependent 
variables and manipulation checks of the study. Comparable to Experiments 1-3, all 
participants first completed the PANAS, with both the positive and negative subsets 
again yielding reliable scales (both alpha's = .82). After this, all participants were 
asked to imagine the following situation: 
 You are working at a prestigious ICT company. Together with a colleague you 
have been working on an assignment for one of the most important clients of 
the company. The amount of duties you and your colleague have to perform 
is equal to each other and you both enjoy working together. You and your 
colleague are working equally hard on the assignment and after one month 
the assignment is completed successfully. The client is very satisfied with the 
work you and your colleague have performed. This is reason for your boss to 
give you both a bonus. You and your colleague are comparable in the 
number of years you are working at the company as well as in age and salary. 
This was followed by the manipulation of outcome. Participants read the sentence 
(manipulated information in italics): 
 You get a bonus of 300 Euros. Your colleague later tells you that he received 
a bonus of 300 / 500 Euros. 
The dependent variables and manipulation checks were then measured. Building on 
Experiments 1-3, participants' judgments of outcome justice were assessed by asking 
participants how just (1 = very unjust, 7 = very just), appropriate (1 = very 
inappropriate, 7 = very appropriate), and justified (1 = very unjustified, 7 = very 
justified) they considered the bonus that they received. Participants' answers to these 
three items were averaged to form a reliable scale of their outcome justice judgments 
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(alpha = .96). 
 At the end of the experiment, we checked whether participants became more 
on their alert as a result of the flashing light manipulation: We asked participants 
whether they noticed the flashing light (all participants in all conditions reported that 
they did) and then we asked asked participants whether the flashing light led them to 
be alert (1 = very weakly, 7 = very strongly) and to be attentive (1 = very weakly, 7 = 
very strongly). Participants' answers to these two items were averaged to form a 
reliable scale of participants' alertness (alpha = .83). We also assessed whether, 
instead of, or in addition to, increasing alertness, the flashing light manipulation 
increased participants' levels of agitation: Participants were asked whether the 
flashing light made them feel agitated (1 = very weakly, 7 = very strongly) and tense 
(1 = very weakly, 7 = very strongly). Participants' answers to these two items were 
averaged to form a reliable scale of agitation (alpha = .96). After this, participants 
were debriefed. Participants were not suspicious about our manipulations and did not 
object to the experimental procedure used in the experiment. 
Results 
 Manipulation check. A 2 x 2 ANOVA on the alertness scale showed a main 
effect of the flashing light manipulation only, F(1, 169) = 9.18, p < .01.7 This showed 
that participants in the condition where the flashing light was switched on indicated to 
be more alert (M = 2.11, SD = 1.31) than participants in the condition where the 
flashing light was switched off (M = 1.56, SD = 1.09).  
 It can also be noted here that a 2 x 2 ANOVA did not yield significant effects 
on the agitation measure, indicating that the flashing light manipulation did not affect 
participants' level of agitation, F(1, 168) = 0.12, p > .73 (overall M = 1.24, SD = 
0.69). These findings suggest that the flashing light manipulation reliably affected 
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alertness whereas it did not reliably influence agitation. We will discuss the 
implications of these findings in the General Discussion. 
 PANAS. As in Experiments 1 to 3, a 2 x 2 MANOVA on the positive and 
negative subsets of the PANAS yielded no effects at both the multivariate and 
univariate levels. This suggests that overall affective states cannot explain the findings 
reported here. Overall means of the positive and negative subsets were 2.85 (SD = 
0.67) and 1.46 (SD = 0.51), respectively. Furthermore, after applying the appropriate 
Bonferroni adjustment (see Hays, 1981), a 2 x 2 MANOVA on all the 20 PANAS 
items did not show significant effects, suggesting that in Experiment 4 specific 
affective reactions were not influenced by our flashing light manipulation. 
 Dependent variables. Participants' outcome justice judgments indicated a 
main effect of outcome, F(1, 176) = 307.43, p < .001, as well as the predicted 
interaction effect, F(1, 176) = 5.11, p < .03. The main effect of the flashing light 
manipulation was not significant. Figure 4 illustrates these effects. As hypothesized, 
results showed that the simple main effect of the outcome manipulation was stronger 
in the condition where the flashing light was switched on, F(1, 176) = 195.92, p < 
.001, η2 = .53, than in the condition where the flashing light was switched off, F(1, 
176) = 116.63, p < .001, η2 = .40. These findings indicate that in the condition where 
the flashing light was switched off, participants' justice judgments were more positive 
following the good outcome (M = 5.17, SD = 1.56) than following the bad outcome 
(M = 2.32, SD = 1.15). Furthermore, in the condition where the flashing light was 
switched on, participants' outcome justice judgments differed even more between the 
good (M = 5.86, SD = 1.18) and bad (M = 2.16, SD = 1.05) outcomes. 
 The flashing light manipulation yielded a significant simple main effect 
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within the good outcome condition, F(1, 176) = 6.81, p < .02, and a nonsignificant 
effect within the bad outcome condition, F(1, 176) = 0.35, p > .55. We will return to 
this finding in the General Discussion. 
General Discussion 
 Building and extending on the human alarm system literature, we reasoned in 
the current paper that we would obtain strong evidence for our line of reasoning if 
viewing large exclamation points prior to making evaluations of the justice of 
accurate or inaccurate procedures (Experiment 1), good or bad outcomes (Experiment 
2), and voice or no-voice procedures (Experiment 3) would yield the hypothesized 
effects on participants' justice judgments and their response latencies. The findings of 
Experiments 1 to 3 supported our hypotheses. Furthermore, Experiment 4 extended 
these findings by showing that a flashing warning light produced similar effects on 
outcome justice judgments and perceived alertness among participants with various 
educational backgrounds and from different age groups who were walking in a 
shopping center of a typical Dutch city. That is, in correspondence with the alarm-
system view of the justice judgment process presented in this paper, the findings of 
Experiment 4 reveal that the mere presence of a flashing light that has been switched 
on can lead people to show more extreme justice judgments in response to variations 
in good and bad outcomes. Also, participants in the conditions where the flashing light 
had been switched on indicated that they felt they were more alert than those in the 
conditions where the flashing light was switched off.  
 Taken together, the findings of the experiments presented here suggest that 
the presence of alarming stimuli, such as exclamation points (Experiments 1-3) and 
flashing lights (Experiment 4), indeed can lead to more extreme justice judgments 
about subsequently experienced procedures (Experiments 1 and 3) and outcomes 
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(Experiments 2 and 4), not only when reacting to justice scenarios (Experiments 1, 2, 
and 4), but also when assessed in a more experiential context (Experiment 3), and not 
merely in controlled laboratory studies (Experiments 1-3), but also when encountered 
in a more real-life context (Experiment 4). 
 The juxtaposition of the alarm system and justice literatures presented here is 
a strength of the current paper, we think, but a reader may wonder why the vigilance, 
provoked by the alarm system, resulted in more extreme judgments rather than more 
nuanced judgments. We think there may be three good reasons for this. The first 
reason why we predicted this effect was that our review of the human alarm and 
justice judgment literatures indicated that the same conditions that activate the human 
alarm system also lead to more extreme justice judgments. This suggested to us that if 
we would activate the human alarm system directly by presenting alarm-related 
stimuli to people, this might well lead to more extreme judgments about subsequently 
presented justice-related procedures and outcomes. The findings of Experiments 1 to 
4 are in accordance with this line of reasoning. 
 The second reason is that although alarming conditions may sometimes 
instigate contemplation or introspection in human beings (cf. Bechara, 2005), we 
argue that most alarming situations do not allow for contemplation and introspection, 
but instead require that people respond rather quickly to what is going on. Thus, we 
do not rule out that contemplation, and hence slower reaction times and perhaps more 
nuanced judgments sometimes may be the result of an activated alarm system, but we 
also argue that the more common response may be faster and more extreme reactions. 
The findings presented in this paper seem to support the conclusion that this is a more 
likely reaction. Of course, we would applaud future research that would show more 
contemplation in alarming situations. Very interesting in this respect are some very 
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recent findings reported by Eisenberger, Lieberman, and Satpute (in press) that 
suggest that people who score high in dispositional self-consciousness may react with 
more controlled, as opposed to more intuitive, responses to an activated alarm system. 
The third reason is that modern justice judgment research and recent justice 
theories suggest that how people typically form judgments of justice and morality 
may in fact be best understood by focusing on intuitive processes (Haidt, 2001), 
affective-experiential states (Maas & Van den Bos, 2006), spontaneous inferences 
(Ham & Van den Bos, 2006), self-related thoughts (Loseman, Van den Bos, & Ham, 
2006), and self-defensive processes (Van den Bos, Miedema, & Vermunt, 2006). In 
other words, people seem to form their justice judgments in rather reflexive ways, as 
opposed to reflecting carefully on how to form these judgments (cf. Lieberman, 2003; 
Lieberman, Gaunt, Gilbert, & Trope, 2002; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). This suggests to 
us that the justice judgment process may be especially sensitive to reflex-related 
aspects of alarm-related stimuli, rather than to reflection-related aspects of the human 
alarm system (cf. Lieberman, 2003), leading them to respond faster and with more 
extreme judgments in alarming situations. This possible implication of the current 
paper seems to us to deserve further investigation. 
 The specific pattern of effects on people's justice judgments in the four 
studies also deserves some reflection here. That is, as noted in the Results sections, in 
three out of four studies (Experiments 1, 2, and 4), our findings suggested that it may 
be especially in people's reactions to fair events, such as accurate procedures 
(Experiment 1) and good outcomes (Experiments 2 and 4), that alarm-related 
manipulations have their effect on people's justice judgments. This finding is in 
accordance with the view that, after the alarm system has been activated, people may 
react particularly positively to the experience of fair events as the relational quality 
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and inclusion message conveyed by fair treatment and other fair experiences (cf. Lind, 
2001; Leung et al., 2004; Tyler & Lind, 1992) may signal the soothing message that 
threats are manageable or that there is less reason for alarm than initially felt. In other 
words, experiences of fair events may switch an activated alarm system from "Code 
Red" back to "Code Orange" or "Code Green."  
This said, it should also be noted explicitly that in Experiment 3 the 
exclamation point manipulation did not show statistically significant effects of the 
exclamation point manipulation within both the voice and no-voice conditions, and in 
fact was marginally significant within the no-voice condition whereas such a trend 
was not found within the voice condition. Moreover, when we pooled results across 
Experiments 1 to 4, then the effects of the alarm manipulations were significant 
within both the fair and the unfair conditions, although the effect was somewhat 
stronger in the fair conditions, F(1, 534) = 15.27, p < .001, η2 = .03, than in the unfair 
conditions, F(1, 534) = 4.51, p < .04, η2 = .01. An interesting topic for future research 
would be to sort out whether alarm-related manipulations generally have more impact 
on how people react to fair events than on how they respond to unfair events and, if 
so, to further explore the precise psychological mechanisms that may explain this 
differential impact. 
Implications 
 The importance of exclamation points and flashing lights as important alarm-
related cues that moderate the justice judgment process has not been considered 
before in the justice literature. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, the possible 
impact of exclamation points and flashing lights on human judgment processes in 
general has not been studied before in the alarm-system literature (for reviews, see, 
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e.g., Carter et al., 2000; Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2004; Eisenberger et al., 2003; 
Klein, 1996; Liddell et al., 2005; Lieberman & Eisenberger, 2004; Tillfors, 2004; see 
also Elliot, Maier, Moller, Friedman, & Meinhardt, in press). This attests to the new 
contribution of the line of reasoning presented here and indicates the possible 
importance of the current findings for the literatures on human judgments in general 
and justice judgments in particular. 
 Furthermore, our findings may be important precisely because they raise the 
possibility that not only justice judgments but also other social judgments might be 
influenced by the presentation of stimuli like exclamation points or flashing lights. 
Previous justice theories have tended to assume that there is something unique about 
the justice concept; something that makes the process of how justice judgments are 
formed stand apart compared to the processes with which people form judgments of 
other constructs (see, e.g., Lerner, 1977, 1980, 2003; Montada, 1998, 2002; see also 
Cropanzano, Goldman, & Folger, 2003; Folger, 1984, 2001; Folger, Cropanzano, & 
Goldman, 2005; Mikula, 2005). Our conjecture is that justice may sometimes have 
unique qualities and that it may sometimes not. A challenge for future justice research 
is to find out the conditions under which the justice judgment process shows unique 
aspects and when it does not. An important, indeed a theoretically exciting aspect of 
the current findings is that they suggest that justice judgments conform to other alarm-
related judgments (see, e.g., Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2004; Eisenberger et al., 2003; 
Lieberman & Eisenberger, 2004; Murray et al., 2002, 2005). 
More generally, although we truly appreciate and value the attempts in the 
justice literature to study what makes the psychology of the justice concept different 
from the psychology of other concepts, in the current paper we argue that this may 
have come at the expense of relative neglect for a thorough examination of the basic 
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processes that also may play a pivotal role in how people form justice judgments. 
Therefore, we have explicitly focused here on the basics of the justice judgment 
process. Indeed an important implication of the findings presented here is that they 
suggest that the justice judgment process may share important similarities with the 
processes that determine other human judgments and responses. In investigating this 
issue, one aim of this paper was to show that the justice judgment process may be 
affected by sometimes subtle cues in people's environments; cues that may not have 
been revealed when one would have studied justice judgments as being something 
unique, compared to other human judgments.  
From the literature on arousal it seems unlikely that physiological arousal has 
been affecting strongly the effects of our exclamation point manipulations on 
participants' reactions to the subsequent procedures or outcomes of Experiments 1 to 
3 (see, e.g., Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm, 1993). Specifically, the arousal 
literature suggests that physiological arousal effects in response to minimal 
manipulations (like the exclamation point manipulation we used in Experiments 1-3) 
in all likelihood will have disappeared after 1 minute (see, e.g., Lang et al., 1993). 
Given the fact that we used the 20-items PANAS questionnaire as our filler tasks 
(which clearly took longer than 1 minute to complete) it seems unlikely that 
physiological arousal can explain the findings reported here. Furthermore, the 
findings reported in Experiment 4 suggest that the flashing light manipulation did not 
affect perceived agitation and, as intended with this manipulation, did influence 
perceived alertness. These findings are in correspondence with what we intended with 
our manipulations, but of course we would applaud further research on these 
important issues. Interesting in this respect is that in Experiment 2 we found an effect 
of our exclamation point manipulation on the PANAS item that assesses excitement, 
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such that participants felt more excited in the exclamation point condition than in the 
scrambled exclamation point condition. This effect was only found in one of our four 
experiments and when we controlled for participants' excitement scores participants' 
outcome justice judgments still showed a stronger effect of the outcome manipulation 
in the exclamation point condition than in the scrambled exclamation point condition. 
This said, we explicitly encourage future research to further examine the 
psychological processes which alarm-related manipulations may prime. 
 Another interesting implication that may follow from an alarm-system view 
of the justice judgment process involves the possible distinctions between alarm 
activations that occur prior to the justice judgment process and those that occur within 
the justice judgment process. In the current studies, the human alarm system was 
activated by events that happened before the justice judgment process occurred. An 
alternative sequence of events is that the alarm system could be activated as a result of 
events that happen during the justice judgment process. The former would constitute 
justice-exogenous activation of the alarm system and the latter justice-endogenous 
activation. An example of the latter may be being treated in an unfair manner by your 
new supervisor in an important meeting, an alarming experience that might augment 
the effect of the experience on justice judgments. Endogenous activation would lead 
people to alertly process what is going on, how to make sense of this, and to be more 
alert in subsequent interactions with the supervisor. 
 It might be the case that justice-exogenous and justice-endogenous alarm-
related factors are differentially related to fair and unfair events. For example, 
perhaps, as a result of either socialization (e.g., Lerner, 1977, 1980) or evolutionary 
processes (De Waal, 1996), people have learned to rely on fair treatment to cope with 
exogenous alarm-inducing events (cf. the current findings). In contrast, experiences of 
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unfair treatment might activate justice-endogenous alarm systems that then augment 
the processing of the unfair treatment information that stimulated the alarm. This 
would suggest that experiences of unfair events may serve as wake-up calls whereas 
fair events may calm people down. To carry the logic of this line of thought one step 
further, unfair experiences would then have special relevance in relatively calm 
situations, in which the alarm system is not very active, whereas fair events have an 
especially important social function in times when the alarm system has already been 
activated. Future research is obviously needed to test these interesting yet speculative 
implications of the current research.  
 Now that the current findings have been found in the pioneering studies 
presented here, future research can start to test the implications of our findings in 
studies that have higher levels of ecological validity. For example, future research 
might assess how people react to fair and unfair treatment by their management when 
the business context may make the human alarm system more versus less active. 
Furthermore, now that evidence has been obtained for the important role that alarm-
related symbols may have in the social psychology of justice, future theoretical work 
can explore the implications of these findings for other justice theories, such as group-
value (e.g., Lind & Tyler, 1988), just world (e.g., Lerner, 1977, 1980; Hafer, 2000), 
and moral virtue (e.g., Cropanzano et al., 2003; Folger, 2001; Folger et al., 2005) 
explanations of social justice. Perhaps revisiting these theories in light of our findings 
will reveal that groups, just world beliefs, and/or ideas about mortal virtues are 
important to people because these issues may activate human alarm systems or help 
people to manage already activated alarm systems. 
 Related to this, as noted earlier, the studies reported here were in part inspired 
by the conjecture that uncertainty management findings reported in the justice 
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literature (see, e.g., Van den Bos, 2001; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002; Van den Bos et 
al., 2005) may be explained by the notion that experiences of personal uncertainty 
may often constitute alarming events to people and that it is this alarm-related 
component of uncertainty manipulations that may be largely driving uncertainty 
effects reported in the social psychological literature (Hogg, 2005; McGregor et al., 
2001; Murray et al., 2002). Furthermore, Brockner and Wiesenfeld (1996) observed 
that fairness effects are often stronger in the presence of negative outcomes. Because 
under most circumstances negative outcomes are more likely than positive outcomes 
to activate the human alarm system, the outcome-based moderation that Brockner and 
Wiesenfeld observed may be a special case of the more general moderation of fairness 
effects by alarm-related stimuli. These are all speculative remarks, of course, but 
these speculations as well as the future studies that may follow from them, now have 
been made possible by means of the research presented here and these speculations 
may well give rise to new, more powerful social justice theories. 
Conclusions 
The question of how people form justice judgments has fascinated and puzzled 
philosophers and social theorists for centuries. In the current paper, a new social 
psychological hypothesis on this issue was put forward focusing on the human alarm 
system as a potential moderator of the justice judgment process. Building and 
extending on this basic hypothesis, we proposed that the presentation of exclamation 
points or flashing lights would reliably lead to more extreme judgments about 
subsequent justice-related events. Our findings indeed provide support for this line of 
reasoning. It is our hope that the theoretical implications of the line of reasoning and 
findings presented here will further social psychologists' understanding of the justice 
judgment process and may contribute to the growing literature on the human alarm 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 












Adams, J. S. (1965). Inequity in social exchange. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in 
experimental social psychology (Vol. 2, pp. 267-299). New York: Academic 
Press. 
Barrett-Howard, E., & Tyler, T. R., (1986). Procedural justice as a criterion in allocation 
decisions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 296-304. 
Bechara, A. (2005). Decision making, impulse control and loss of willpower to resist 
drugs: A neurocognitive perspective. Nature Neuroscience, 8, 1458-1463. 
Blau, P. M. (1964). Exchange and power in social life. New York: Wiley. 
Brockner, J., & Wiesenfeld, B. M. (1996). An integrative framework for explaining 
reactions to decisions: Interactive effects of outcomes and procedures. 
Psychological Bulletin, 120, 189-208. 
Callejas, A., Lupianez, J., & Tudela, P. (2004). The three attentional networks: On their 
independence and interactions. Brain and Cognition, 54, 225-227. 
Carter, C. S., Macdonald, A. M., Botvinick, M., Ross, L. L., Stenger, V. A., Noll, D., 
& Cohen, J. D. (2000). Parsing executive processes: Strategic vs. evaluative 
functions of the anterior cingulate cortex. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences USA, 97, 1944-1948. 
Cohen, J., Cohen, P., West, S. G., & Aiken, L. S. (2003). Applied multiple 
regression/correlation analysis for the behavioral sciences (3rd ed.). Hillsdale, 
NJ: Erlbaum. 
Cook, R. D. (1977). Detection of influential observations in linear regression. 
Technometrics, 19, 15-18. 
Cropanzano, R., Goldman, B., & Folger, R. (2003). Deontic justice: The role of moral 
principles in workplace fairness. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 24, 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 





De Cremer, D., & Sedikides, C. (2005). Self-uncertainty and responsiveness to 
procedural justice. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 41, 157-173. 
De Cremer, D., & Tyler, T. R. (2005). Managing group behavior: The interplay 
between procedural justice, sense of self, and cooperation. In M. P. Zanna 
(Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 37, pp. 151-218). San 
Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
De Waal, F. (1996). Good natured: The origins of right and wrong in humans and 
other animals. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Eisenberger, N. I., & Lieberman, M. D. (2004). Why rejection hurts: A common 
neural alarm system for physical and social pain. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 8, 294-300.  
Eisenberger, N. I., Lieberman, M. D., & Satpute, A. B. (in press). Personality from a 
controlled processing perspective: An fMRI study of neuroticism, 
extraversion, and self-consciousness. Cognitive, Affective, and Behavioral 
Neuroscience. 
Eisenberger, N. I., Lieberman, M. D., & Williams, K. D. (2003). Does rejection hurt? 
An fMRI study of social exclusion. Science, 302, 290-292. 
Elliot, A. J., Maier, M. A., Moller, A. C., Friedman, R., & Meinhardt, J. (in press). 
Color and psychological functioning: The effect of red on performance 
attainment. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. 
Fazio, R. H. (1990). A practical guide to the use of response latency in social 
psychological research. In C. Hendrick & M. S. Clark (Eds.), Research methods 
in personality and social psychology (pp. 74-97). Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
Folger, R. (Ed.). (1984). The sense of injustice: Social psychological perspectives. New 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 





Folger, R. (2001). Fairness as deonance. In S. Gilliland, D. Steiner, & D. Skarlicki 
(Eds.), Theoretical and cultural perspectives on organizational justice (pp. 3-33). 
Greenwich, CT: Information Age Publishers. 
Folger, R., & Cropanzano, R. (1998). Organizational justice and human resource 
management. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Folger, R., Cropanzano, R., & Goldman, B. (2005). What is the relationship between 
justice and morality? In J. Greenberg & J. A. Colquitt (Eds.), Handbook of 
organizational justice: Fundamental questions about fairness in the workplace 
(pp. 215-246). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Folger, R., Rosenfield, D., Grove, J., & Corkran, L. (1979). Effects of "voice" and peer 
opinions on responses to inequity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
37, 2253-2261. 
Folger, R., & Skarlicki, D. P. (1998). A popcorn metaphor for employee aggression. In 
R. Griffin, A. O'Leary-Kelly, & J. Collins (Eds.), Dysfunctional behavior in 
organizations: Volume 1. Violent behavior in organizations (pp. 43-82). 
Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
Greenberg, J. (1993). Stealing in the name of justice: Informational and interpersonal 
moderators of theft reactions to underpayment inequity. Organizational Behavior 
and Human Decision Processes, 54, 81-103. 
Greene, J. D., Nystrom, L. E., Engell, A. D., Darley, J. D., & Cohen, J. D. (2004). The 
neural bases of cognitive conflict and control in moral judgment. Neuron, 44, 
389-400. 
Greene, J. D., Sommerville, B., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2001). 
An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment. Science, 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 





Hafer, C. L. (2000). Do innocent victims threaten the belief in a just world? Evidence 
from a modified Stroop task. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 
165-173. 
Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach 
to moral judgment. Psychological Review, 108, 814-834. 
Ham, J., & Van den Bos, K. (2006). On the automaticity of justice knowledge 
activation. Manuscript submitted for publication. 
Hays, W. L. (1981). Statistics (3rd ed.). New York: Holt-Saunders. 
Hogg, M. A. (2004). Uncertainty and extremism: Identification with high entitativity 
groups under conditions of uncertainty. In V. Yzerbyt, C. M. Judd, & O. 
Corneille (Eds.), The psychology of group perception: Perceived variability, 
entitativity, and essentialism (pp. 401-418). New York: Psychology Press. 
Hogg, M. A. (2005). Uncertainty, social identity and ideology. In S. R. Thye & E. J. 
Lawler (Eds.), Advances in group processes (Vol. 22, pp. 203-230). New 
York: Elsevier. 
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. H. (1986). Fairness and the assumptions of 
economics. Journal of Business, 59, 285-300. 
Kirk, R. E. (1995). Experimental design: Procedures for the behavioral sciences (3rd 
ed.). Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole. 
Klein, D. F. (1996). Panic disorder and agoraphobia: Hypothesis hothouse. Journal of 
Clinical Psychiatry, 57, 21-27. 
Lang, P. J., Greenwald, M. K., Bradley, M. M., & Hamm, A. O. (1993). Looking at 
pictures: Affective, facial, visceral, and behavioral reactions. 
Psychophysiology, 30, 261-273. 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 




Lerner, M. J. (1977). The justice motive: Some hypotheses as to its origins and forms. 
Journal of Personality, 45, 1-52. 
Lerner, M. J. (1980). The belief in a just world: A fundamental delusion. New York: 
Plenum Press. 
Lerner, M. J. (2003). The justice motive: Where social psychologists found it, how they 
lost it, and why they may not find it again. Personality and Social Psychology 
Review, 7, 388-399. 
Leung, K., Tong, K.-K., & Ho, S. S.-H. (2004). Effects of interactional justice on 
egocentric bias in resource allocation decisions. Journal of Applied Psychology, 
89, 405-415. 
Leventhal, G. S. (1980). What should be done with equity theory? New approaches to 
the study of fairness in social relationships. In K. J. Gergen, M. S. Greenberg, & 
R. H. Willis (Eds.), Social exchange: Advances in theory and research (pp. 27-
54). New York: Plenum. 
Liddell, B. J., Brown, K. J., Kemp, A. H., Barton, M. J., Das, P., Peduto, A., Gordon, 
E., & Williams, L. M. (2005). A direct brainstem-amygdala-cortical 'alarm' 
system for subliminal signals of fear. Neuroimage, 24, 235-243. 
Lieberman, M. D. (2003). Reflexive and reflective judgment processes: A social 
cognitive neuroscience approach. In J. P. Forgas, K. P. Williams, & Von Hippel, 
W. (Eds.), Social judgments: Implicit and explicit processes (pp. 44-67). 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Lieberman, M. D., & Eisenberger, N. I. (2004). The neural alarm system: Behavior 
and beyond. Reply to Ullsperger et al. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8, 446-
447. 
Lieberman, M. D., Gaunt, R., Gilbert, D. T., & Trope, Y. (2002). Reflexion and 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 




reflection: A social cognitive neuroscience approach to attributional inference. 
In M.P. Zanna (Red.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 34, pp. 
199-249). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Lind, E. A. (2001). Fairness heuristic theory: Justice judgments as pivotal cognitions in 
organizational relations. In J. Greenberg & R. Cropanzano (Eds.), Advances in 
organizational behavior (pp. 56-88). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Lind, E. A., Greenberg, J., Scott, K. S., & Welchans, T. D. (2000). The winding road 
from employee to complainant: Situational and psychological determinants of 
wrongful termination claims. Administrative Science Quarterly, 45, 557-590. 
Lind, E. A., & Tyler, T. R. (1988). The social psychology of procedural justice. New 
York: Plenum. 
Loseman, A., Van den Bos, K., & Ham, J. (2006, August). The social psychology of 
justice as a self-related process. Paper presented at the Eleventh International 
Conference on Social Justice Research, Berlin, Germany. 
Maas, M., & Van den Bos, K. (2006). An affective-experiential perspective on 
reactions to fair and unfair events: Effects of individual differences in affect 
intensity moderated by experiential mindsets. Manuscript submitted for 
publication. 
McGregor, I. (2004). Zeal, identity, and meaning: Going to extremes to be one self. In 
J. Greenberg, S. L. Koole, & T. Pyszczynski (Eds.), Handbook of 
experimental existential psychology (pp. 182-199). New York: Guilford Press. 
McGregor, I., Zanna, M. P., Holmes, J. G., & Spencer, S. J. (2001). Compensatory 
conviction in the face of personal uncertainty: Going to extremes and being 
oneself. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80, 472-488. 
Miedema, J., Van den Bos, K., & Vermunt, R. (2006). The influence of self-threats on 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 




fairness judgments and affective measures. Social Justice Research, 19, 228-
253. 
Mikula (2005). Some observations and critical thoughts about the present state of 
justice theory and research. In S. Gilliland, D. Steiner, D. Skarlicki, & K. van 
den Bos (Eds.), What motivates fairness in organizations (pp. 197-210). 
Greenwich, CT: Information Age Publishing. 
Montada, L. (1998). Justice: Just a rational choice? Social Justice Research, 12, 81-
101. 
Montada, L. (2002). Doing justice to the justice motive. In M. Ross & D. T. Miller 
(Eds.), The justice motive in everyday life (pp. 41-62). Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Moorman, R. H., & Byrne, Z. S. (2005). How does organizational justice affect 
organizational citizenship behavior? In J. Greenberg & J. A. Colquitt (Eds.), 
Handbook of organizational justice: Fundamental questions about fairness in 
the workplace (pp. 355-380). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Murray, S. L. (2005). Regulating the risks of closeness: A relationship-specific sense 
of felt security. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 14, 74-78. 
Murray, S. L., Holmes, J. G., & Collins, N. L. (2005). The relational signature of felt 
security. Paper presented at the 2005 Conference of the Society of 
Experimental Social Psychology, San Diego, USA. 
Murray, S. L., Holmes, J. G., & Griffin, D. W. (2000). Self-esteem and the quest for 
felt security: How perceived regard regulates attachment processes. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 78, 478-498. 
Murray, S. L., Holmes, J. G., MacDonald, G., & Ellsworth, P. C. (1998). Through the 
looking glass darkly? When self-doubts turn into relationship insecurities. 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 




Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 1459-1480. 
Murray, S. L., Rose, P., Bellavia, G. M., Holmes, J. G., & Garrett Kusche, A. (2002). 
When rejection stings: How self-esteem constrains relationship-enhancement 
processes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 556-573. 
Posner, M. I., & Petersen, S. E. (1990). The attention system of the human brain. 
Annual Review of Neuroscience, 13, 25-42. 
Steiner, D. D., Guirard, S., & Baccino, T. (1999, May). Cognitive processing of 
procedural justice information: Application of the Oculometer. Paper presented 
at the Annual Conference of the Society for Industrial/Organizational 
Psychology, Atlanta, GA. 
Strack, F., & Deutsch, R. (2004). Reflective and impulsive determinants of social 
behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 8, 220-247. 
Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (1989). Using multivariate statistics (2nd ed.). New 
York: Harper & Row. 
Thibaut, J., & Kelley, H. H. (1959). The social psychology of groups. New York: Wiley. 
Tillfors, M. (2004). Why do some individuals develop social phobia? A review with 
emphasis on the neurobiological influences. Nordic Journal of Psychiatry, 58, 
267-276. 
Tyler, T. R. (2006). Why people obey the law. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 
Tyler, T. R., & Lind, E. A. (1992). A relational model of authority in groups. In M. P. 
Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 25, pp. 115-191). 
San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Van den Bos, K. (2001). Uncertainty management: The influence of uncertainty 
salience on reactions to perceived procedural fairness. Journal of Personality 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 




and Social Psychology, 80, 931-941. 
Van den Bos, K. (2006). Hot cognition and social justice judgments: The combined 
influence of cognitive and affective factors on the justice judgment process. 
Manuscript submitted for publication. 
Van den Bos, K., Heuven, E., Burger, E., & Fernández Van Veldhuizen, M. (2006). 
Uncertainty management after reorganizations: The ameliorative effect of 
outcome fairness on job uncertainty. International Review of Social Psychology, 
19, 75-86. 
Van den Bos, K., & Lind, E. A. (2002). Uncertainty management by means of fairness 
judgments. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology 
(Vol. 34, pp. 1-60). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Van den Bos, K., Lind, E. A., Vermunt, R., & Wilke, H. A. M. (1997). How do I judge 
my outcome when I do not know the outcome of others? The psychology of the 
fair process effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 1034-
1046. 
Van den Bos, K., & Miedema, J. (2000). Toward understanding why fairness matters: 
The influence of mortality salience on reactions to procedural fairness. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 355-366. 
Van den Bos, K., Miedema, J., & Vermunt, R. (2006). Exploring how people respond 
to conflicts between self-interest and fairness: The influence of threats to the 
self on reactions to advantageous inequity. Manuscript submitted for 
publication. 
Van den Bos, K., Poortvliet, P. M., Maas, M., Miedema, J., & Van den Ham, E.-J. 
(2005). An enquiry concerning the principles of cultural norms and values: 
The impact of uncertainty and mortality salience on reactions to violations and 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 




bolstering of cultural worldviews. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 
41, 91-113. 
Van den Bos, K., & Rijpkema, M. (2007). Studying effects of exclamation point primes 
using functional neuroimaging. Unpublished manuscript. 
Van den Bos, K., & Van Prooijen, J.-W. (2001). Referent cognitions theory: The role of 
closeness of reference points in the psychology of voice. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 81, 616-626. 
Van den Bos, K., Vermunt, R., & Wilke, H. A. M. (1997). Procedural and distributive 
justice: What is fair depends more on what comes first than on what comes next. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 95-104. 
Van den Bos, K., Wilke, H. A. M., Lind, E. A., & Vermunt, R. (1998). Evaluating 
outcomes by means of the fair process effect: Evidence for different processes 
in fairness and satisfaction judgments. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 74, 1493-1503. 
Van Prooijen, J.-W., Karremans, J. C., & Van Beest, I. (2006). Procedural justice and 
the hedonic principle: How approach versus avoidance motivation influences 
the psychology of voice. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91, 
686-697. 
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief 
measures of positive and negative affect: The PANAS scales. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 1063-1070. 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 





 1In the experiments presented here, controlling for gender did not alter the 
interpretation of the findings reported nor did the other demographic variables of 
Experiment 4 affect the results. Hence, these variables were dropped from the 
analyses. 
 
2Distributions of response latencies generally are positively skewed (Kirk, 
1995). Part of this may be caused by the fact that some participants accidentally were 
not paying attention to the items they were supposed to respond to. Therefore, 
following recommendations by Fazio (1990), the response latencies were first 
checked for extreme outliers. Two (out of 124) participants were indeed extreme 
outliers (see Fazio, 1990) as the response latencies of these 2 participants (Ms = 10.49 
and 13.06) were 3 standard deviations above the overall mean (M = 3.51, SD = 1.90). 
As suggested by Fazio (1990), the response latencies of these 2 participants were 
discarded. Logarithmic transformations were applied to the remaining response 
latencies. This transformation is suggested for variables that are positively skewed, 
such as response latencies (Kirk, 1995). Participants' transformed response latencies 
were averaged to form a reliable scale of their response latencies (alpha = .78). 
Analysis of variance was conducted on this scale of transformed response latencies. 
To make interpretation of the analysis of variance results more understandable, we 
will present the relevant means and standard deviations in seconds, and not in 
logarithmically transformed values. 
 
3The response latencies of 1 participant (M = 17.86) were 3 standard 
deviations above the overall mean (M = 4.32, SD = 3.00). Using the same statistical 
procedures as in Experiment 1, the response latencies of this participant were 
discarded, logarithmic transformations were applied to the remaining response 
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latencies, and participants' transformed response latencies were averaged to form a 
reliable scale of their response latencies (alpha = .90). 
 
4When we controlled for participants' excitement scores, participants' 
outcome justice judgments still yielded a significant interaction effect, F(1, 54) = 
5.75, p < .03, showing that the effect of the outcome manipulation was stronger in the 
exclamation point condition, F(1, 54) = 236.48, p < .001, η2 = .81, than in the 
scrambled exclamation point condition, F(1, 54) = 135.96, p < .001, η2 = .72. 
 5These 10 participants constituted 5 percent of our initial data set, and 
consisted of 3 men and 7 women, randomly distributed among our conditions, with 2 
or 3 participants per condition. Retaining these participants in our data set still yielded 
a stronger procedure effect on participants' procedural justice judgments in the 
exclamation point condition, F(1, 181) = 123.66, p < .001, η2 = .41, than in the 
scrambled exclamation point condition, F(1, 181) = 103.87, p < .001, η2 = .37, 
although we should note explicitly that this pattern of findings was definitely weaker 
than the pattern we obtained when these participants were not included in our data 
analyses (see Results section). Keeping the participants in the data set still indicated 
that in the scrambled exclamation point condition, participants' procedural justice 
judgments were more positive following the voice procedure (M = 5.35, SD = 1.30) 
than following the no-voice procedure (M = 2.94, SD = 0.93), and that in the 
exclamation point condition the difference between the voice (M = 5.39, SD = 1.09) 
and no-voice (M = 2.75, SD = 1.21) conditions was even greater. 
 
6The response latencies of 1 participant (M = 19.23) were 3 standard 
deviations above the overall mean (M = 4.70, SD = 2.19). Using the same statistical 
procedures as in Experiments 1 and 2, the response latencies of this participant were 
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discarded, logarithmic transformations were applied to the remaining response 
latencies, and participants' transformed response latencies were averaged to form a 
reliable scale of their response latencies (alpha = .75). 
 
7Responses of some participants were missing on the alertness and agitation 
measures (n's = 8 and 9, respectively), causing the degrees of freedom in the analyses 
of variance reported on these two measures. 
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Figure 1. Mean procedural justice judgments as a function of the characters and procedure manipulations of Experiment 1. Means are on 7-point 
scales, with higher values indicating higher levels of judgments of procedural justice. 
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Figure 2. Mean outcome justice judgments as a function of the characters and outcome manipulations of Experiment 2. Means are on 7-point 
scales, with higher values indicating higher levels of judgments of outcome justice. 
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Figure 3. Mean procedural justice judgments as a function of the characters and procedure manipulations of Experiment 3. Means are on 7-point 
scales, with higher values indicating higher levels of judgments of procedural justice.  
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Figure 4. Mean outcome justice judgments as a function of the flashing light and outcome manipulations of Experiment 4. Means are on 7-point 
scales, with higher values indicating higher levels of judgments of outcome justice. 
